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Summary 
Control of A. f~tua is mandatory in The Netherlands under the 'Wild Oat Control 
Order' which requires fanners to destroy plants, or at least the panicles, to prevent 
seed shedding. Prior to the introduction of this Order A. fatua was common. 
Infestations have now declined, and the weed is rare throughout the country. 
Following the discovery of a serious new infestation of A. fatua on the Statefarm in 
the IJsselmeerpolders, an eradication program was begm1 in 1982. This was essential 
both to comply with the Order and to preserve the value of this newly reclaimed land. 
After five years of treating infestations with selective herbicides and roguing, A. fatua 
continued to spread. New strategies consisting of a careful inventory of infested fields, 
preventive meastu·es to avert new infestations and curative measures to control known 
infestations were implemented in 1987. The eradication program has cost 
approximately Hfl 6.0 million over 13 years with a peak of expenditure of Hfl l 
million in 1988. The area infested has been substantially reduced. The costs of the 
eradication program were 42% lower than those estimated for controlling A. fatua 
m1der a simulated policy of manipulation, which was based on the rate of spread 
recorded in the initial years ofthe program. Aspects of the eradication program that 
have contributed to its success are briefly discussed. 
Introduction 
Control ofweeds in cropping systems usually aims to reduce their injurious impact on the crop, 
reduce spread and lower the population. These combined objectives can be regarded as a 
manipulative type of weed control policy. Such a policy implies that the weed will not be eliminated 
and that there will be recurring infestations and costs of implementing control. 
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An altemative control policy is to eradicate weeds by reducing the population (including 
propagules) to zero (Auld et al., 1987). TI1e benefit of eradicating a weed is freedom fi·om losses and 
avoidance of continuing costs of control. Eradication programs are invariably highly labour and cost 
intensive because the cost of searching escalates as weeds become less fi·equent. Ideally, eradication 
programs should be justified by benefit cost analyses, but this is rarely the case because of data 
limitations. Consequently, most eradication programs are justified on social or political grOLmds, such 
as hmnan health or dmg policies, perceived threats such as noxious potential or ability to invade and 
denigrate environmentally sensitive habitats, valuable agticu.ltm·allands or by endangedng productive 
enterpdses or natural resources. 
Twenty five years ago, A vena fatua L. was the most imp011ant weed of arable land in the 
Netherlands. Changes in crop rotation, improved chemical control measures and the gazetting of the 
phytosanitary "Wild Oat Control Order", a law instigated in 1965 at the request of farmers, led to 
a substantial reduction in the occurrence of A. fatua across fields and fanns throughout the coLmtry 
(Naber, 1977). Under the Order, control of A. fatua plants and prevention of seed shed is mandatory, 
and the demise of A. fatua was especially attributed to the widespread adoption of these 
requirements by fanners. 
During the early 1980's, new infestations of A. fatua were discovered in the IJsselmeerpolders in 
the Netherlands and a program of eradication was initiated (Naber et al., 1992). 
In this paper, the costs of the eradication program are reported and compared to those estimated 
for controlling A. fatua m1der a policy of manipulation, where intervention primarily involved annual 
tactical applications ofherbicide. 
Materials and Methods 
Tile IJsselmeerpolders consists ofnewly reclaimed land. In 1980 approximately 20,000 ha of arable 
lands were placed under the judsdiction of the Ministry of Public Works, as a Statef1mn, for 
development as prime agticultmalland. Once developed, land has been leased to pdvate fanners, and 
by 1995 the area ofthe Statefitrm had decreased to 4,000 ha. h1 1996 the remaining land ofthe 
Statefa1m is to be assigned to the local mtmicipality. 
In 1982, A. fatua was subjected to an eradication program on the Statefann to comply with the 
Order, and ensme the high value of the land was prese1ved. The policy involved applying herbicides 
to control infestations and smveying, mapping and roguing fields. 
Stricter procedures were enforced in 1987 as there had been considerable spread and an increase 
in density over the initial five years of the program. These new procedures entailed an inventory of 
all infested fields to dete1mine the extent and distdbution of infestations, the implementation of strict 
preventive measures to avert new infestations and tighter curative measures of chemical control and 
hand roguing with an emphasis on preventing seed shed. 
Scouting teams inspected and rogued fields usually twice each year and infestations were mapped 
as light, medium or heavy, where: 
Light means < l plant/20 m2 ; 
Medium means > 1 plant/20 m2 to < 1 plant/m2 ; 
teavy means > l plant/m2• P ventive measures consisted of using crop seed produced only on fields fi·ee of A. fatua and ens, ·ing that machines used to work infested fields did not enter clean fields. 
Cm·ative measmes were carried out with selective herbicides- in cereals, mainly difenzoquat during 
the first 10 years, then fenoxaprop-ethyl during 1993/4, and sethoxydim in beans and flax. On 
densely infested fields or patches the crop and A. fatua plants were totally removed and destroyed 
before seedset of the weed. Light infestations were hand rogued once or twice a year after the 
panicles became visible above the crop. 
Since 1992, searching and hand roguing has been carried out fi·om a tractor equipped with a 12m 
boom with inspectors seated at each end. Operating at a speed of 6-8 km/hour along tramlines 24 
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m apat1, and stopping only to remove detected plants, approximately 80 ha/day can be inspected and 
cleaned using Statefarm employees and student labour. 
Administration ofthe program has involved the recording and mapping since 1982 ofthe infested 
areas, and the time and money spent in searching for and controlling the weed. These data are herein 
used to compare eradication versus manipulative type policies. Because the eradication program 
failed to contain the weed in the initial five years, when control relied primarily upon tactical use of 
herbicides, we have assumed that this period more closely resembled manipulation. The rate of 
spread calculated over the initial five year period was used to predict the area infested under a 
manipulative type policy, and this is compared wih what happened under the overall eradication 
program. In both schemes, yield loss arising fi·om competition by A. fatua was calculated using the 
model ofCousenseta/. (1986), where Y"c = 7.5 t/ha, ~'max= 0.01, y = 0.01 and wheat valued@ Hfl 
350/t. 
Results 
Under the eradication policy initiated in 1982, and rein forced with stricter procedures in 1987, the 
area sprayed increased fi·om 38 ha in 1982 to 2660 ha in 1988, then progressively declined to 15 ha 
in 1993. In 1994 the area sprayed increased slightly to 66 ha (Table 1 ). Titese trends were reflected 
in the cost of spraying which totalled Hf12.86 million. A similar sum, Hfl 2.82 million was spent on 
searching and hand roguing, and this cost likewise peaked in 1987/88 and declined following the 
implementation of the stricter eradication procedures (Table 1 ). Loss calculated on a 1% yield loss 
(equivalent to 1 plant/m2) over the area sprayed cost Hfl 0.36 million. Tite total cost of the 
eradication program over 13 years has been Hfl 6.04 million. Over this period, the area of the 
Statefann progressively declined from 18,988 ha in 1982 to 6,520 ha in 1994. 
Between 1982 and 1987 the spread of A. fatua, and subsequently the area sprayed, increased 
linearly (Fig. 1 ), indicating that the initial eradication measures were ineffective at containing the 
weed. Using the linear model, it was predicted that 5,406 ha would have been infested by 
1994 ifthe weed had continued to be managed in the same way. 
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Fig. 1. Increase in area sprayed over initial five years of the A. fatua eradication program. 
Relationshjp y = -446.9 + 450.2x (r2 = 0.975). 
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Table 1. Actual cost of eradicating A. jatua compared with predicted cost of chemical control under a simulated policy of manipulation. 
Eradication program Simulated manipulation 
Actual Area Average Cost of Cost of Cost of Predicted Cost of Cost of 
area of cost of herbicide searching yield area herbicide yield 
sprayed Statefarm spraying + + loss sprayed + loss 
application roguing 
(Hfl)* 
application 
Year (ha) (ha) (Hfl/ha) (Hfl)* (Hfl)* (ha) (Hfl)* (Hfl)* 
1982 38 18988 383.63 14578 89361 1183 3 600 103 
1983 574 18307 199.47 114496 71250 17478 454 90559 13809 
1984 640 17332 193.81 124041 183370 19125 905 175340 27005 
1985 1422 15972 212.03 301504 370643 41888 1354 287089 39882 
1986 1802 14758 235.29 424003 336046 53388 1804 424463 53450 
1987 2296 13222 243.26 558528 536594 67633 2254 548308 66404 
1988 2660 11960 234.07 622638 531030 77978 2705 633159 79282 
1989 1559 11130 238.18 371330 276370 45127 3155 751458 91316 
1990 529 10168 242.18 128111 180108 15012 3605 873059 102301 
1991 693 9529 245.24 169949 65522 19096 4055 994448 111740 
1992 70 8469 266.16 18631 45873 1873 4505 1199051 120566 
1993 15 7638 157.19 2358 93915 394 4956 779034 130082 
1994 66 6520 152.89 10091 37344 1733 5406 826523 141900 
Total 2860258 2817426 361908 7583091 977840 
*Values indexed to 1993 prices based on consumer price index data published in Landbouwcijfers 1995, Eds LEI-DLO/CBS. 
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Based on tWs predicted spread of A. fatua, treatment of the annually increasing area with 
herbicide was estimated to cost Hfl 7.58 million. As for the eradication program, an average of 
1 plant/m2 was assumed across the predicted area, which resulted in a total yield loss due to 
competition ofHfl 0.98 million. The combined cost under the simulated policy of manipulation 
was estimated at Hfl 8.56 million over the same petiod (Table I). 
Discussion 
Over the term studied it appears that a policy of manipulation would have been 42% more 
costly than the actual cost ofthe eradication program (Hfl 8.58 versus 6.04 million). Under the 
eradication program the area infested with A. fatua has been significantly reversed and the annual 
maintenance cost has been reduced to < Hfl 50,000. ll1e cost of the eradication program is 
underestimated since no accowtt of the cost or value of destroying densely infested crops is 
included. On the other hand, the cost attributed to yield loss is overestimated by assuming an 
average density of 1 plant/m2• By contrast, control by manipulation would have seen annual 
increases in the area infested and recurring annual costs of> Hfl 0.83 million. In addition, it is 
envisaged that losses from competition would also have increased, but until more infonnation 
is available on the rate of increase in density this cannot be estimated. For these reasons we 
consider the benefit cost of this program is substantially w1derestimated. 
Because elimination is generally considered uneconomic for established weeds, an eradication 
policy for a widespread weed such as A. fatua would be exceptional. This inevitability leads to 
the conclusion expressed by Zimdahl (1995) that such "Weeds will always be with us ... ". A 
common criterion for eradication programs, therefore, is that the weed has restricted 
distribution. In this case study, A. fatua in fact had restricted distribution. l11e Statefann was 
essentially a closed system whereby there was control over imports to the area, eliminating any 
possibility of introducing new seed stocks of the weed. It was also managed under one policy, 
even though in the initial years it consisted of six sub-farms with individual managers. These 
circumstances allowed the whole farm to be managed without the need for a system of 
quarantine, as was necessary for example in the case of Chondri/fa jtmcea L. in Australia (Dodd, 
I 987). l11is indicates that, given the desire, it would seem feasible to eradicate a weed in a 
regional context if all managers cooperated according to a common policy and the region ~ould 
be isolated fi·om extemal influences. 
Eradication is most likely to succeed in practice if implemented soon after detection of a newly 
introduced weed in a country or region, before it becomes widely naturalised (Zamora et-a/., 
1989). This ptinciple is evident, for example, in relation to Cyperus escu/entus L. in the 
Netherlands (Naber & Rotteveel, 1986) and several weeds in Australia (Medd, l987a,b; Dodd, 
1990). Initiation of eradication procedures immediately after detection has undoubtedly 
contributed to the successfi1l impact of the IJsselmeerpolders project, even though spread was 
not checked in the initial years. 
Eradication is especially difficult in agricultural habitats because of the movement of seed 
between fields and fanns by livestock or machinery, through dispersal in residues or by natural 
agents. Whilst searching and hand roguing were carried out in the initial years, in addition to 
spraying known infested fields, this failed to contain the weed in the IJsselmeerpolders project. 
Once steps were taken in I 987 to limit the dispersal of seed within and between fields and sub-
farms the rate of increase rapidly declined, indicating that this was the critical factor goveming 
containment. Although the manual operations were carefully and diligently perfonned, this 
indicates that seed must have been produced and dispersed. Thus, any measures which can be 
developed to improve the performance of searching and roguing would clearly be ofbenefit to 
eradication programs. The finding also indicates that, in the absence of effective dispersal 
mechanisms, some weeds could be tackled if they have vulnerable characteristics such as low 
rates of reproduction, poor rectuitment or seedling survivorship or non persistent propagules. 
1311 
• 
An inability to fonn persistent seed banks could indicate that eradication is at least theoretically 
possible for certain species, if dispersal or seed production is controlled (Medd eta/. 1995). TI1is 
is the basis to an ongoing program to eradicate C. juncea in Westem Australia (Dodd, 1987; 
1990). Unlike the Usselmeetpolders project, a fiuther important aspect of the C. juncea program 
is that searchit1g is undertaken on a voltmtary basis by fanners who are implicated, keeping 
maintenance costs of eradication to a minimum. 
In this case study, the population of A. fatua has not yet been eradicated ie. reduced to zero. 
As the area infested has declined it has become e\~dent that some fields, apparently clean for two 
or more years, have been reinfested after deep ploughing or where disturbance from eatihworks 
has been undertaken. In developing the IJsselmeetpolders, fields were deeply ploughed to 
encourage drainage and the mixing of soil to distribute salt concentrations. Inadvertently some 
seeds of A. fatua were butied in this process and a pottion have apparently remained viable, 
providing a potential for reinfesting when brought to the surface. This menacing threat signals 
the need for ongoing vigilance, even in fields that have been apparently free of the weed for 
several years. 
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